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NOTES
Tearing Down the Wall Between Banking
and Commerce: An Evaluation of the
Federal Reserve Board's Implementation
of the New Standard for Permissible
Non-Banking Activities
BY SHAWN A. BAILEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
F or the majority of the twentieth century, a steep barrier existed
between commercial banking activities and other types of financial
activities. On November 12, 1999, the United States Congress lifted this
barrier by passing the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act'
(the "GLB Act"). The primary stated purpose of this Act was to "enhance
competition in the financial services industry by providing a prudential
framework for the affiliation of banks, securities firms, insurance compa-
nies, and other financial service providers."2
Prior to the enactment of the GLB Act, bank holding companies3 and
national banks4 could only engage in limited non-banking activities. Before
"CPA, Commonwealth of Kentucky, 1999; J.D. expected 2003, University of
Kentucky. The author wishes to thank Professor Doug Michael of the University
of Kentucky College of Law and Arthur S. Long, Esq. of Davis Polk & Wardwell
for their invaluable suggestions and advice in writing this Note, and his family for
their unwavering love and support.
'Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113
Stat. 1338 (1999).
21d.
3 A bank holding company is an "[e]ntity controlling one or more commercial
banks." DICTIONARY OF BANKING TERMS 45 (4th ed. 2000).
4 A national bank is a "[c]ommercial bank chartered by the COMPTROLLER OF
THE CURRENCY, an agency of the U.S. Treasury Department." Id. at 306.
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the passage of the GLB Act, the provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act
("Glass-Steagall") explicitly restricted the ability of national banks to deal
in, purchase, or underwrite securities5 and it limited forays into the
securities industry by bank holding companies by disallowing affiliations
between bank holding companies and entities that were "engaged princi-
pally" in securities underwriting or sales.6 For those activities that were not
expressly forbidden by Glass-Steagall proscriptions, financial institutions
had yet another set of hoops through which to jump before they could
engage in non-banking activities. Bank holding companies were only
permitted to engage in those non-banking activities that were "so closely
related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper
incident thereto."7 National banks were similarly restricted in their
non-banking activities and were only empowered in this capacity to
exercise "all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the
business of banking."' Believing that these standards were "not well
adapted to the changes taking place in the financial services industry"9 and
that "developments in technology, globalization of financial services, and
changes in the capital markets have rendered the laws governing financial
services unsuitable and outdated in many respects,"'" Congress set out to
redefine the standards by which banks could engage in non-banking
activities.
12 U.S.C. § 24 (2002).
6 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1933), repealed by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modern-
ization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101(a), 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999).
7 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1956), amended by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial
Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 102(a), 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999).
8 12 U.S.C. § 24. State-chartered banks are subject to similar constraints. See,
e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 96 (McKinney 2002) ("Every bank and every trust
company shall ... have the following powers: 1. To discount, purchase and
negotiate promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, other evidences of debt...
and exercise all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the
business of banking."). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act of 1991 ("FDICIA") imposes a limitation on these powers for state banks,
however. Under FDICIA, state-chartered banks that have FDIC deposit insurance
(effectively almost every state-chartered bank) may not engage as a principal in any
type of activity that is not permissible for a national bank unless (1) the FDIC
determines that the activity would not pose any significant risk to the deposit
insurance funds; and (2) the State bank is in compliance with applicable capital
standards. 12 U.S.C. § 183la(a)(1) (2002).
9 S. REP. No. 106-44, at 3 (1999).
1 I1d.
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This Note will examine the new standard for permissible non-banking
activities and how it compares with the standard in existence prior to the
enactment of the GLB Act. After providing a brief overview of the new
framework created by this legislation," this Note will set out the parame-
ters of the old standard 2 followed by a more detailed discussion of the new
standard 13 and subsequent clarifications made by the regulatory bodies
charged with administering these statutory provisions, some of which were
made at the urging of commentators within the financial industry. 4 A
side-by-side evaluation of these two regimes will identify the changes
brought about by the new standard and will discuss the manner in which the
new standard has been used to foster growth and competition within the
financial services industry in the United States.
11. OVERVIEW OF THE NEW FRAMEWORK
FOR PERMISSIBLE NON-BANKING ACTIVITIES
The GLB Act changed the old framework for permissible non-banking
activities by amending 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) [Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956] to freeze the definition of new activities as
"so closely related to banking"' 5 and permissible for bank holding
companies as of November 12, 1999. In addition, the GLB Act created a
new entity--the financial holding company 6-- and defined its powers by
adding subsection (k)(1) to the Bank Holding Company Act, which permits
financial holding companies to engage in any activity that is considered
"financial in nature or incidental to such financial activity"' 7 or "comple-
mentary to a financial activity and does not pose a substantial risk to the
safety or soundness of depository institutions or the financial system
generally."'" The determination as to whether an activity conducted by a
financial holding company meets one of these criteria is made by the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve (the "Board"), 9 which is the primary
regulator of all bank holding companies and financial holding companies.2"
" See discussion infra Part II.
12 See discussion infra Part III.
'3 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
'4 See discussion infra Parts IV.B, V.
'5 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113
Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999).
16 12 U.S.C. § 18 4 1(p) (2002).
17 Id. § 1843(k)(1)(A) (2002).
' Id. § 1843(k)(1)(B).
S9Id. § 1843(k)(1).
20 Cf id. §§ 1841 (a)(2)(C), (a)(5)(D) (outlining various capacities in which the
Board serves to regulate bank holding companies).
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The GLB Act also expanded the ability of national banks to conduct
non-banking activities by adding 12 U.S.C. § 24a, which allows national
banks to control or hold an interest in financial subsidiaries that engage in
"activities that are financial in nature or incidental to a financial activity.'
Auspiciously missing is the ability of national banks to declare an activity
"complementary" and thus permissible, as the Board is empowered to do.
This omission reflects a policy judgment that these activities may not pose
excessive risk within the framework of a more diversified financial holding
company, but that they pose too much risk to be operated through a national
bank subsidiary. The Secretary of the Treasury regulates national banks
through the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the "OCC") 22 and
has the ability to determine whether or not a non-banking activity falls
within the ambit of the new standard. Operating subsidiaries of national
banks generally may engage in the same activities allowed for financial
holding companies; however, the GLB Act has defined several activities
permitted for financial holding companies that are not permitted for
subsidiaries of national banks: insurance or annuity underwriting,
23
developing or investing in real estate,24 merchant banking,25 and insurance
portfolio investing.26 This differentiation is apparently the result of a
compromise between the Board and the OCC, which was based on the
belief that certain financial activities were "too risky to be placed in a
financial subsidiary of a bank. '27 Notably, the GLB Act did include a sunset
provision, which will take effect on November 12, 2004, and will allow the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and the Secretary of the
Treasury to adopt rules jointly permitting merchant banking activities for
national bank subsidiaries.28
The Board must notify the Secretary of the Treasury prior to declaring
a new non-banking activity to be "financial in nature" or "incidental" to a
financial activity,2 '9 and the Secretary has the ability to block the approval
21 Id. § 24a(a)(2)(A)(i) (2002).
22 Id. § 1 (2002).
23Id. § 24a(a)(2)(B)(i).
24 Id. § 24a(a)(2)(B)(ii).
25 Id. § 24a(a)(2)(B)(iii).
26Id.
27 Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance: Before and
After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 25 J. CORP. L. 723, 759 (2000).
28 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, §
122, 113 Stat. 1338, 1381 (1999).
29 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843(k)(2)(A)(i) (2002), 24a(b)(1)(B)(ii)(I).
[VOL. 91
TEARING DOWN THE WALL
of the Board within thirty days of receiving notice from the Board.3
Similar provisions apply to the Secretary of the Treasury with regard to
approval of non-banking activities for national banks, vesting the Board
with veto powers over the Secretary's findings.3 ' Effectively, both the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Board have the ability to hold a gun to
each other's head in determining whether or not a specific activity is
"financial in nature" or "incidental." In the final analysis, however, the
Board is most likely to be the ultimate authority on what constitutes a
permissible non-banking activity.32 Many remain cynical as to the actual
weight behind these "consultation" provisions. American Banker, a leading
trade journal in the banking industry, reported that "[a]lthough some Fed
determinations are subject to 'consultation' with the Treasury Department,
that obligation is not much of a real restriction. The Fed has been slugging
it out with Treasury and its [OCC] for years, and the Fed almost always has
come out the winner."33
M. THE PRE-GLB ACT REGIME: "So CLOSELY RELATED"
The parameters of the standard for permissible non-banking activities
according to the Board, under both current and prior law, have been
codified in the regulations promulgated under the Bank Holding Company
Act.34 Those non-banking activities that have been designated as permissi-
ble by the Board under the "so closely related" standard (and which
30 Id. §§ 1843(k)(2)(A)(ii), 24a(b)(1)(B)(ii)(II).
11 Id. §§ 1843(k)(2)(B), 24a(b)(1)(B).
32 The House Conference Report on the GLB Act stated that:
[t]he Board has primary jurisdiction for determining what activities are
financial in nature, incidental to financial in nature, or complementary....
The intent of the Conferees is that the Federal Reserve Board and the
Secretary of the Treasury will establish a consultative process that will
negate the need for either agency to veto a proposal of the other agency.
H.R. REP. No. 106-434, at 102 (1999), reprinted in 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. 245, 248.
Based on the reciprocal structure of the consultation provisions, this statement most
likely reflects Congress's judgment that these issues will arise more frequently
before the Board than before the Secretary of the Treasury (thus giving the Board
a greater opportunity to define the parameters of the new standard) as opposed to
a grant of jurisdiction over these issues to the Board superior to the jurisdiction
granted to the Secretary.
33 Steve Blumenthal, Fed May Wind Up Regulating Nonbank Financial Busi-
nesses, AM. BANKER, Mar. 2, 2001, at 12.
34See, e.g., MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANK REGULATION 186 (1999).
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continue to limit bank holding companies that have not elected to become
financial holding companies) are found at Section 225.28 of Title 12 of the
Code of Federal Regulations." Michael P. Malloy, Professor of Law at
McGeorge School of Law at the University of the Pacific, commenting on
the usefulness of such a list, stated that "[a]lthough the inclusion of a
particular activity in the list creates certain procedural advantages in the
processing of a notice, it does not predetermine the outcome of a notice.
The public benefits of the proposed activity, outweighing its possible
adverse affects [sic], must still be demonstrated on a case-by-case basis."36
The need for case-by-case analysis was created by the 1970 Amendments
to the Bank Holding Company Act, which added a "public benefits"
balancing test to the calculus of whether or not a non-banking activity is
permissible." This test was an attempt to create the "necessary flexibility
to allow bank holding companies to meet adequately the financial service
needs of the country and to insure that the activities of these companies do
not result in harm to the public from decreased competition."38 Thus, while
the inclusion of a list of predetermined closely-related activities in the
regulations helped to clarify the standard, the regulations were not
conclusive as to whether an activity would be permitted for any particular
bank holding company.
The 1970 Amendments transformed the "so closely related" standard
into a two-part test: 1) is the activity "so closely related to banking," and,
if so; 2) do the benefits of allowing a bank to undertake the activity
override the adverse effects that allowing a bank to engage in that activity
might create?39 As to the first part of the test, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia characterized it as "a question that asks only whether
the activities in question are generally of a kind that Congress, having
concluded that 'banking and commerce should remain separate,' forbade
bank holding companies to engage in, without regard to the merits of such
engagement in a particular case."4 The origin of the "so closely related"
standard is in the original Bank Holding Company Act of 1956."' The
legislative history of this Act does not explain the exact meaning of this
31 12 C.F.R. § 225.28 (2002).
36 MALLOY, supra note 34, at 187.
37 S. REP. No. 91-1084 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5519, 5530.31 Id. at 5533.
39 Indep. Bankers Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors, 516 F.2d 1206, 1215 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
4o Nat'l Courier Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors, 516 F.2d 1229, 1233 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (footnote omitted).
S411d. at 1236.
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language;42 rather, it appears that the framers of this legislation recognized
that any standard would have to be flexible. The Senate report on this
legislation stated:
In the opinion of [the Committee on Banking and Currency], certain
activities of a financial, fiduciary, or insurance nature are obviously so
closely related to banking as to require no divestment by a bank holding
company .... However, there are many other activities of a financial,
fiduciary, or insurance nature which cannot be determined to be closely
related to banking without a careful examination of the particular type of
business carried on under such activity. For this reason [the Committee on
Banking and Currency] deems it advisable to provide a forum before an
appropriate Federal authority in which decisions concerning the relation-
ship of such activities to banking can be determined in each case on its
merits.
43
Accordingly, the "so closely related" standard appears to have been
intended as a starting point for evaluation as to whether an activity should
be permitted; it does not seem to be a bright-line test in and of itself.
In construing this standard in a case involving a contest of a Board
determination that certain courier services were "so closely related" to
banking and thus permissible, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia decided that the Court "owe[s] considerable deference to the
Board's judgment that a particular activity is 'closely related to banking.'
Rather than define that term with any precision, therefore, we simply
require that the Board go about making its 'closely related' decision in a
reasoned fashion consistent with the legislative intent."" The Court went
on to articulate that in making a determination as to whether an activity is
permissible, the Board may not be arbitrary or capricious and must show
some kind of connection between the activity and the business of banking.
45
This connection, the Court stated, could be shown in one of three ways:
1. Banks generally have in fact provided the proposed services.
2. Banks generally provide services that are operationally or function-
ally so similar to the proposed services as to equip them particularly
well to provide the proposed service.
42Id.
43 S. REP. No. 84-1095 (1956), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2482, 2494.
44 Nat'l Courier Ass'n, 516 F.2d at 1237.
45 id.
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3. Banks generally provide services that are so integrally related to the
proposed services as to require their provision in a specialized
form.
46
While these guidelines added a degree of clarity to the calculus of whether
or not an activity qualifies as "so closely related" to banking, the standard
remained vague. The Supreme Court took notice of the reaction of the
Board to the guidelines enumerated in the National Courier decision,
stating:
The Board has recognized, however, that [these] guidelines do not
provide the exclusive basis for finding that an activity is "closely related"
to banking, and has stated that it will consider "any ... factor that an
applicant may advance to demonstrate a reasonable or close connection
or relationship of the activity to banking. 47
Because of this vagueness, the Board is able to exercise considerable
discretion in determining what activities are permissible for bank holding
companies.48 While this flexibility allowed the Board to "fashion paths
around... impediments" 49 caused by the pre-GLB Act statutory frame-
work, it was deemed to be "no substitute for the establishment of funda-
mental policy by Congress."5 Thus, the passage of the GLB Act swept
away the old statutory framework and replaced it with a new, more
expansive standard. The implementation of this new standard remains in
the hands of the Board, however, and the Board will play an important role
in determining precisely what Congress' fundamental policies were and
how they should best be given effect.
IV. THE GLB ACT: "FINANCIAL IN NATURE," "INCIDENTAL,"
OR "COMPLEMENTARY" TO BANKING
A. Fundamental Changes Brought About by the Shift in the Standard
1. Leveling the Playing Field for Smaller Bank Holding Companies
As a starting point, the new standard for permissible non-banking
activities was intended by Congress to be broader than the prior "so closely
46 Id.
41 Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors, 468 U.S. 207, 211 (1984)
(citation omitted).4 1 Id. at 214.
4 S. REP. No. 106-44, at 5 (1999).
50
Id.
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related" standard.5 In defining a list of permissible activities as "financial
in nature," Congress included all activities that, prior to the enactment of
the GLB Act, had been determined by the Board to have been "so closely
related" to banking. 2 The most obvious expansion from the pre-GLB Act
era was the declaration of insurance underwriting
53 and securities dealing54
as permissible activities. This change resulted in part from the repeal of the
earlier Glass-Steagall provisions that restricted these types of affiliations
between banks and securities firms.55 However, the ability to engage in
limited securities activities had been in place prior to the enactment of the
GLB Act through the use of "Section 20 subsidiaries" that engaged in both
"bank-eligible" securities underwriting (typically government-issued or
guaranteed securities) and "bank-ineligible" securities underwriting.56
Id. at 6.
52 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(F) (2002). The Board has included by regulation
those activities defined as "so closely related to banking" (either by 12 C.F.R. §
225.28 (2002) or by order, as of November 12, 1999) or "usual in connection with
the transaction of banking abroad," (as of November 11, 1999) which are
permissible for bank holding companies, as permissible for financial holding
companies. 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(a)-(b) (2002).
Activities permitted by regulation as "so closely related to banking" include:
providing administrative and other services to mutual funds, owning shares of a
securities exchange, acting as certification authority of digital signatures, and real
estate title abstracting. Id. § 225.86(a). Activities permitted as "usual in connection
with... banking abroad" include: providing management consulting services,
operating a travel agency, and organizing and sponsoring a mutual fund under
certain conditions. Id. § 225.86(b).
13 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(B).
54 1d. § 1843(k)(4)(E).
55 Section 20 of the Banking Act of 1933 (a component of the Glass-Steagall
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1933), repealed by Pub. L. 106-102, § 101(a) (1999), 113
Stat. 1341), had previously prohibited Federal Reserve member banks from
affiliating with any organization that was "engaged principally" in securities
underwriting or sales. The Board defined "engaged principally" by stating that a
Federal Reserve member bank affiliate would not be deemed to be "engaged
principally" in securities underwriting or dealing if "its gross revenue from that
activity does not exceed a range of between 5 and 10 percent of its total gross
revenues." Order Approving Applications to Engage in Limited Underwriting and
Dealing in Certain Securities, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473, 485 (1987). The Courts of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and the Second Circuit upheld this definition. See
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors, 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988); Securities
Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors, 847 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Section 32 (12
U.S.C. § 78, repealed) prohibited interlocking employment between Federal
Reserve member banks and securities firms.56See MALLOY, supra note 34, at 188.
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Through this loophole, large bank holding companies such as J.P. Morgan
& Co., Inc., Citicorp, and Bankers Trust New York Corporation were able
to engage in securities underwriting activities in which Federal Reserve
member banks could not engage.57
As the Board, over time, increased the amount of permissible securities
underwriting as a percentage of the gross revenues of a bank holding
company subsidiary, commercial banks increasingly acquired investment
banks to exploit this loophole.5" The removal of the restrictions placed on
bank holding companies by Glass-Steagall leveled the playing field,
allowing smaller bank holding companies to engage in the same activities
previously limited to their larger competitors. By defining securities and
insurance underwriting as "financial in nature" in the GLB Act itself,
Congress expressly signaled that it was comfortable with allowing bank
holding companies to engage in these types of activities, just as they could
before Depression-era legislation, like Glass-Steagall, was passed into
law. In addition, the removal of the Glass-Steagall prohibitions and the
Board regulations that accompanied them corrected the inequitable
situation whereby banks could acquire brokers but brokers could not
acquire banks.59
The removal of the explicit "public benefits" test, which the 1970
Amendments added, when Section 1843(c)(8) was amended by the GLB
Act, was somewhat more subtle.6" In lieu of such a balancing test for
financial holding companies, Congress provided regulators with "factors to
be considered" in determining whether or not an activity is permissible as
"financial in nature" or "incidental to a financial activity.""s These
guidelines include the types of public benefits listed in the 1970 version of
57 Order Approving Applications to Engage in Limited Underwriting and
Dealing in Certain Securities, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473 (1987). Prior to the repeal of
Section 20, the Board had allowed bank holding companies to engage in
underwriting bank-ineligible securities up to twenty-five percent of their total gross
revenues. See Revenue Limit on Bank-Ineligible Activities of Subsidiaries of Bank
Holding Companies Engaged in Underwriting and Dealing in Securities, 61 Fed.
Reg. 68,750 (Dec. 30, 1996).
58 See Blumenthal, supra note 33, at 12.
59Id.
60 The 1970 Amendments stated that the Board, in considering whether an acti-
vity is permissible, shall consider its public benefits, including "greater conve-
nience, increased competition, or gains in efficiency, that outweigh possible
adverse effects, such as undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair
competition, conflicts of interest, or unsound banking practices." 12 U.S.C. §
1843(c)(8)(2002).
61 Id. § 1843(k)(3).
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Section 1843(c)(8), but expand on them significantly by specifically
addressing issues relating to technology and physical security issues.62 The
most important function of this change is to merge an expanded version of
the "public benefits" test into the determination of whether or not an
activity is "financial in nature" or "incidental to a financial activity. 63
Under the prior scheme, an activity could be defined as "so closely related"
to banking and be permitted for one bank holding company to undertake,
but the same activity could be deemed impermissible for another bank
holding company to undertake because the particular circumstances of that
second bank holding company led to a different balance of adverse effects
and public benefits.64 By folding a determination that the benefits of an
activity outweigh its adverse effects into the decision to deem an activity
"financial in nature" or "incidental to a financial activity," Congress
created a unitary test. Once an activity is deemed permissible, either by the
GLB Act itself or by regulations promulgated under its authority, a
financial holding company may engage in that activity without having to
obtain prior approval from the Board.65
This analysis not only levels the playing field by treating all financial
holding companies equally, but also reduces the administrative burden for
financial holding companies who previously had to obtain regulatory
approval before engaging in a non-banking activity, regardless of whether
it was previously permitted for another holding company. Under the new
regulatory regime, all a financial holding company must do is notify the
Board, in writing, of its engagement in a non-banking activity within thirty
days of either commencing the activity in question or acquiring control of
a company engaging in that activity.' According to William J. Sweet, a
partner with Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, this after-the-fact
notification should make financial holding companies more nimble and
competitive. 67 Notable, however, is that this improvement only applies to
62 Id.
63 Id.
4 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized the case-by-
case nature of the "public benefits" test, stating that the test is "one which normally
must be resolved upon specific facts.... Naturally the conclusion that the non-
banking activity of one bank holding company would be anticompetitive or threaten
'unsound banking practices' may not hold for a different bank holding company
under different circumstances." Nat'l Courier Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors, 516 F.2d
1229, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
65 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(6)(B).
66Id. § 1843(k)(6)(A); 12 C.F.R. § 225.87(a) (2002).
67 Dean Anason, Fed to Approve 100 'Holding Company' Applications, AM.
BANKER, Mar. 10, 2000, at 1.
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activities that have been defined previously as "financial in nature" or
"incidental to a financial activity." Activities that are defined as "comple-
mentary to a financial activity" are still subject to a case-by-case review
before a financial holding company may engage in the proposed activity.68
In addition, bank holding companies that have not made an effective
election to become financial holding companies continue to be subject to
a case-by-case public benefits review,69 just as they were before the passage
of the GLB Act.
2. Umbrella Regulation by the Federal Reserve Board
Before a bank holding company may engage in expanded financial
activities permitted under the new standard, it must meet certain require-
ments. First, all of the depository institution subsidiaries of the bank
holding company must be "well-capitalized"7 and "well-managed."'" The
Board has maintained that it has the authority to restrict the activities of
subsidiaries of financial holding companies based on these criteria, even
though these subsidiaries may engage in businesses such as insurance
underwriting or securities broker-dealer activities that are already subject
to functional regulation.72 In commenting on the Board's interim rule
concerning the manner in which a company elects to be a financial holding
company, financial services industry leaders criticized the position of the
Board and claimed that the Board lacks the regulatory authority to make
judgments about the managerial staff or capital sufficiency of a subsidiary
that is already subject to oversight by regulators with authority over a
particular business.73 While it modified the language reserving authority to
restrict the activities of financial holding companies when it adopted the
final rule, the Board refused to change its position. Responding to these
allegations, the Board stated:
Section 8 of the [Bank Holding Company] Act, section 8 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act, and other applicable statutes long have given the
68 12 U.S.C. § 18430)(1)(A).
69 Id. § 1843(j)(2)(A). In certain circumstances, a bank holding company may
qualify for automatic approval without being subject to a public benefits review,
including that the bank holding company and its lead depository institution are
well-capitalized and well-managed and the proposed activity has already been
deemed permissible either by statute, regulation or order. Id. § 18430)(3)-(4).
70Id. § 1843(l)(1)(A).
7' Id. § 1843(l)(1)(B).
72Rob Garver, Fed Said to Stretch New Law to Regulate Nonbank Activities,
AM. BANKER, Apr. 10, 2000, at 2.
73 Id.
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Board supervisory authority to restrict the conduct of bank holding
companies where necessary or appropriate to protect the safety and
soundness of depository institutions or otherwise further the purpose of
Federal banking laws. Although the GLB Act amended several of these
provisions, it did not limit the general applicability of the Board's
supervisory power over bank holding companies that become financial
holding companies. Therefore, the final rule continues to provide that the
Board may take appropriate supervisory action against a [financial
holding company] if the Board believes that the company does not have
the appropriate financial and managerial resources to commence or
conduct an activity, make an acquisition, or retain ownership of a
company, or the Board believes such action is appropriate to enforce
applicable Federal law.74
In maintaining this position, the Board holds considerable authority not
only in allowing a bank holding company to make its election to become a
financial holding company, but also to supervise its activities once it
becomes a financial holding company and engages in permitted activities.
Bank holding companies were always subject to Board regulation, even
prior to the passage of the GLB Act. The umbrella regulation of the GLB
Act, however, will enable the Board to be yet another regulatory body with
which securities firms (who already answer to the Securities & Exchange
Commission as well as state regulators) and insurance firms (who already
answer to state insurance regulators) must deal if they merge with a
financial holding company--a prospect at which many large insurance and
securities firms have balked.75 Peter Wallison, a former general counsel to
the Treasury Department, has opined that "'[v]ery few companies have
wanted, or will want, to let the Fed determine what businesses they can
enter'... 'The [GLB Act's] requirement that companies that control banks
engage only in activities that the Fed defines as "financial in nature" is its
fatal flaw.' ,76
7' Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 66 Fed. Reg. 400,
402-03 (Jan. 3, 2001). The final rule regarding Board authority to exercise
supervisory authority is codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225.82(g) (2002).
75 SeeRob Garver, Reality Has Discouraged Bank-Insurer Merger Deals, AM.
BANKER, Feb. 20, 2001, at 6 (quoting Peter Wallison, a former Treasury
Department general counsel, who is now a resident fellow at the American
Enterprise Institute).
76Barbara A. Rehm, In Focus: Critics Show Impatience with Fed's Implemen-
tation of G-L-B, AM. BANKER, Nov. 19,2001, at 1. As Samuel J. Baptista, Morgan
Stanley's lead lobbyist, characterized some non-banks' concerns, becoming a
financial holding company is like entering "the roach motel.... Once you enter,
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Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Roger W. Ferguson, Jr. emphasized
that the financial holding company structure requires an agency to assess
overall risk, regardless of the risks present in each separate subsidiary. In
a speech to the National Association of Urban Bankers in San Francisco in
May 2000, Mr. Ferguson stated that "[e]ven if individual subsidiaries are
considered to be financially strong and well-managed by bank, thrift, or
functional regulators, their risk profiles may change when they are
amalgamated into a consolidated organization."77 Attempting to assuage
the concerns of the financial services industry about what this type
of regulation might entail, Mr. Ferguson pledged that in fulfilling its role
as "umbrella regulator," the Board will use information obtained by
financial holding company subsidiaries' functional regulators as much as
possible and may conduct joint examinations with these functional
regulators to minimize the burden of Board regulation." Mr. Ferguson
stressed that "[u]mbrella supervision is not intended to impose bank-like
supervision on financial holding companies as a whole, or on either
regulated or non-regulated non-bank subsidiaries of financial holding
companies." 9
In addition to the well-capitalized and well-managed criteria for
electing financial holding company status, the Board requires that a bank
holding company file a declaration with the Board stating that the bank
holding company elects to become a financial holding company to engage
in activities that were previously not permitted for bank holding companies,
along with a certification that the company is well-capitalized and
well-managed." Once a company has successfully obtained financial
holding company status, it may still be prevented from engaging in
expanded activities or acquiring control of a company engaging in such
activities if any insured depository institution subsidiary of the financial
holding company received less than a "satisfactory" rating at its most recent
Community Reinvestment Act examination. This requirement does not
you can't exit... Once the Fed gets its grip on you, you're stuck." Id. Others have
speculated that it is not only the specter of Board oversight that has kept non-banks
from becoming financial holding companies but also the fear that the Board will
move too slowly in exercising its authority to approve new financial activities. Id.
" Rob Garver, Fed Vows Not to Hobble Holding Companies, AM. BANKER,
May 30, 2000, at 1.
78 Id.
79 Id.
1o12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1) (2002). For further detail, see the Board's implement-
ing regulations at 12 C.F.R. § 225.81-.83 (2002).
8112 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(2). See also 12 C.F.R. § 225.84(a).
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apply, however, to acquisitions of merchant banking or insurance portfolio
investments.82
B. The Board's Interpretations of the New Standard
1. Activities That Are "Financial in Nature"
or "Incidental to a Financial Activity"
a. Merchant Banking Limitations
Section 4(k)(4) of the Bank Holding Company Act was amended by the
GLB Act to define nine categories of activities that are permissible as being
"financial in nature,'' 3 one of the most significant of which is merchant
banking.' Bank holding companies were permitted to engage in limited
amounts of merchant banking activities prior to the enactment of the GLB
Act, much as they were able to engage in securities underwriting on a
limited basis. For instance, under the Bank Holding Company Act, bank
holding companies themselves are allowed to invest in not more than five
percent of any class of voting shares (or 24.9% of total equity8S) of a
company, or in as much as forty-nine percent of a company through
subsidiaries (such as small business investment companies, or SBICs) that
meet certain government criteria.86 Large bank holding companies, such as
Chase Manhattan Corp., Citigroup, Inc., Bank of America Corp.,
FleetBoston Financial Corp., and Wells Fargo & Co., used this ability to
pursue sizeable and active venture capital businesses.8 7 For example, in
12 See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(2)(B); 12 C.F.R. § 225.84(b)(i).
83 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(A)-(I).
14 Id. § 1843(k)(4)(H).
85 Proposed Investment by Sumitomo Bank Deemed Consistent with Bank
Holding Company Act, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 24, 25 (1987).
86 See Jathon Sapsford, Fed to Make Banks Boost Capital to Cover Venture-
Investing Risks, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2000, at A4. See also 12 U.S.C. §
1843(c)(6). A financial holding company may acquire more than five percent of
any class of voting shares of a company that is not engaged exclusively in activities
that are financial in nature, incidental, or otherwise permissible for a financial
holding company only if: (1) the acquired company is "substantially engaged" in
permitted activities; (2) the acquiring financial holding company complies with all
applicable notice requirements; and (3) the acquired company terminates or divests
all activities that are not permitted within two years of the financial holding
company's acquisition of more than five percent of its voting shares. 12 C.F.R. §
225.85(a)(3)(i)(A)-(C) (2002).
87 Sapsford, supra note 86.
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1999, Chase's venture capital unit, Chase Capital Partners, had $2.5 billion
in revenue, which translated into $1.3 billion in profits for Chase.8
In enacting the GLB Act, Congress chose not to limit merchant banking
activities of financial holding companies expressly by statute. Rather, the
GLB Act included a provision that authorized the Board and the Secretary
of the Treasury to promulgate regulations that govern the extent of
permissible merchant banking activities for financial holding companies. 9
Pursuant to this authority, the Board and the Secretary issued interim rules
that defined the types of merchant banking investments that financial
holding companies could make,9" limited the ability of a financial holding
company to manage or operate a portfolio company,9 and set the permissi-
ble holding period for merchant banking investments at ten years.92 Most
significantly, these regulations established aggregate thresholds below
which financial holding companies could make merchant banking
investments without Board review: the lesser of six billion dollars or thirty
percent of a financial holding company's Tier 1 capital, or the lesser of four
billion dollars or twenty percent for private equity fund investments.93 At
the same time, the Board and the Secretary issued a capital proposal that
would require financial holding companies to take a capital charge of fifty
cents of Tier 1 capital for every dollar of merchant capital investment they
made in order to compensate for the risk of loss inherent in merchant
banking investments.94
These proposals drew a significant amount of criticism from financial
services industry leaders, lawmakers, and regulators. Banks maintained that
they already set aside sufficient reserves to compensate for the risks
inherent in merchant banking activities.95 For instance, large banks such as
Chase Manhattan already reserved capital equal to fifty percent of their
merchant banking investments prior to the issuance of the initial capital
proposal.96 Other critics claimed that the cap on merchant banking invest-
88 Id.
89 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(7).
90Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,460,
16,473 (Mar. 28, 2000). See 12 C.F.R. § 225.170 (2002) (codified rule).
9' Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. at
16,460, 16,473.
921 d. at 16,474.
931d. at 16,475.
941d. at 16,480.
95 Jathon Sapsford, Deals & Deal Makers: Regulators Propose Tougher Stan-
dards for Banks Pursuing Venture-Capital Plans, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2000, at
C13.96Id.
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ments was too restrictive and contradicted the intent of the GLB Act to
promote merchant banking by financial holding companies." As a result,
the Board and the Secretary made significant revisions before issuing a
final rule in January 2001, which removed the six billion dollar threshold
on the aggregate amount of permitted investments.98 In February 2001, the
Board and the Secretary jointly proposed a revised capital charge that cut
the previous charge by more than one-half and introduced a sliding scale
with a top charge of twenty-five cents on the dollar for merchant banking
investments in excess of twenty-five percent of Tier 1 capital.99 In January
2002, after receiving comments on the capital charge proposal, the Board
and the Secretary issued a final capital charge rule that is substantially
similar to the proposed rule.'00 Effective April 1, 2002, this final rule
incorporated the sliding scale for capital charges as proposed'0' and caused
the expiration of the aggregate threshold for merchant banking invest-
ments, 2 which had been set at thirty percent of the financial holding
company's Tier 1 capital with no dollar cap.103
9' Rob Blackwell, Revised Fed Merchant Bank Rules Draw Cheers, AM.
BANKER, Jan. 11,2001, at 1.9' Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 66 Fed. Reg. 8466,
8478 (Jan. 31, 2001). See 12 C.F.R. § 225.174 (2002) (codified rule).
99 Capital; Leverage and Risk-Based Capital Guidelines; Capital Adequacy
Guidelines; Capital Maintenance: Nonfinancial Equity Investments, 66 Fed. Reg.
10,212, 10,216 (Feb. 14, 2001).
100 Capital; Leverage and Risk-Based Capital Guidelines; Capital Adequacy
Guidelines; Capital Maintenance: Nonfinancial Equity Investments, 67 Fed. Reg.
3784, 3786 (Jan. 25, 2002).
0' The sliding scale is as follows: for merchant banking investments (including
those made through SBICs) having an aggregate adjusted carrying value of less
than fifteen percent of the Tier 1 capital held by all of the depository institutions
controlled by the financial holding company, a capital charge of eight percent of
Tier 1 capital would be required on all investments not made through SBICs. If
aggregate merchant banking investments (including SBIC investments) exceed
fifteen percent but are less than twenty-five percent of the organization's Tier 1
capital, a twelve percent capital charge would be required on the adjusted carrying
value of investments made over the fifteen percent threshold. For aggregate
investments equaling twenty-five percent or more of the organization's Tier 1
capital, a twenty-five percent capital charge would be required on the adjusted
carrying value of investments made over the twenty-five percent threshold. 12
C.F.R. pt. 225, app. A (2002).
"0 Capital; Leverage and Risk-Based Capital Guidelines; Capital Adequacy
Guidelines; Capital Maintenance: Nonfinancial Equity Investments, 67 Fed. Reg.
at 3786. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.174(c) (sunset automatically upon issuance of a final
rule regarding appropriate capital charges for merchant banking investments.)
103 12 C.F.R. § 225.174(a)(1).
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In crafting the final rule on merchant banking activities and the revised
capital charge proposal, the Board and Secretary of the Treasury demon-
strated that they would be receptive to the concerns of the financial services
industry. H. Rodgin Cohen, chairman and senior partner of New York law
firm Sullivan & Cromwell, noted that "[t]here is no question that the
Federal Reserve has clearly listened to the concerns of the industry. They
have really made an effort to meet those concerns because the reduction for
the capital charge is significant."'" Contentious issues remained even after
the issuance of the final merchant banking rules and interim capital charge
proposal, such as whether or not capital charges would apply retroactively
to private equity investments made prior to enactment of the GLB Act. °5
The Board and the Secretary, however, once again showed their receptive-
ness to commenters' concerns in the final capital charge rule, which applied
the new capital charges only to investments made on or after March 13,
2000 (the date on which financial holding companies' authority to make
merchant banking investments became effective). 6 For those who feared
that the Board would negate the gains in financial services industry
modernization made by the GLB Act, the willingness of the Board and the
Secretary to work with the industry to arrive at a workable compromise is
an encouraging sign.
b. General Rules for New Activities
As discussed above, the GLB Act itself identified a number of activities
that are permissible as "financial in nature."'0 7 Additional authority was
granted to the Board to define further what activities are "financial in
nature" or "incidental to a financial activity" by order or regulation.0 8 The
GLB Act, however, limited this authority to certain categories of activities:
"(i) Lending, exchanging, transferring, investing for others, or safeguarding
financial assets other than money or securities. (ii) Providing any device or
other instrumentality for transferring money or other financial assets. (iii)
Arranging, effecting, or facilitating financial transactions for the account
' oSee Rob Blackwell, Merchant-Bank Plan: Praise, Muted Criticism, AM.
BANKER, Jan. 22, 2001, at 5.
" See Rob Blackwell, Banks Ask Merchant Investment Exceptions, AM.
BANKER, Apr. 26, 2001, at 1.
"o See Capital; Leverage and Risk-Based Capital Guidelines; Capital Ade-
quacy Guidelines; Capital Maintenance: Nonfinancial Equity Investments, 67 Fed.
Reg. 3784, 3786 (Jan. 25, 2002); 12 C.F.R. pt. 225, app. A (II)(B)(5)(e).
107 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4) (2002).
108Id. § 1843(k)(5)(A).
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of third parties.""'1 Pursuant to this authority, the Board set forth an interim
rule that defines these three categories of activities as "financial in nature"
or "incidental to a financial activity" when conducted pursuant to Board
approval. " 0 The staff of the Board commented on this definition, stating:
These three categories encompass a wide range of activities. Included in
these categories are some activities in which financial holding companies
and national banks and their financial subsidiaries are already permitted
to engage .... The categories were intended, however, to allow financial
holding companies and financial subsidiaries to engage in activities that
were not otherwise permitted for these companies."'
Given the broad scope of the statutory language, the Board has opted
to create a mechanism by which financial holding companies and their
subsidiaries may file requests for approval of non-banking activities that
have not previously been defined as "financial in nature" or "incidental to
a financial activity," rather than expressly define what would make a
proposed activity "financial in nature" or "incidental to a financial
activity."" 2 This request procedure places the onus on the applicant to not
only specifically describe the activity and how it would be conducted,' " but
also to provide information as to how the proposed activity falls into one
of the three categories defined in the statute."" The Board will then
evaluate the request, taking into account the factors that it otherwise is
directed by statute to consider whenever it must determine whether an
activity is "financial in nature" or "incidental to a financial activity.""' 5
In addition, once the Board has determined that a particular activity is
"financial in nature" or "incidental," a procedure exists through which a
financial holding company may request an advisory opinion from the Board
as to whether a specific proposed activity of the financial holding company
9Id. § 1843(k)(5)(B).
10 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(e) (2002).
"1 Financial Subsidiaries, 66 Fed. Reg. 257, 258 (Jan. 3, 2001).
112 Id.
"3 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(e)(4)(i).
1 4 Id. § 225.86(e)(4)(ii).
"1 Id. § 225.86(e)(3). The factors to be considered are listed at 12 U.S.C. §
1843(k)(3) (2002) and generally relate to the purposes of the GLB Act, changes in
the financial services marketplace and technology, and whether the activity is
necessary or appropriate to enable a financial holding company to compete
effectively in the financial services industry, efficiently deliver financial services,
and offer customers cutting-edge technological means for using financial services.
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falls within the scope of the activity previously permitted." 6 This process
does not include the Secretary of the Treasury, as does the rulemaking
process for defining new categories of permitted activities." 7 As such, the
advisory opinion loophole may serve as a vehicle to enable the Board to
expand the scope of permitted activities without having to consult with the
Secretary of the Treasury.
c. Board Definitions for Specific Activities
Although a mechanism exists for requests from parties wishing to
engage in a particular activity, the Board maintains the ability to determine
whether or not a particular activity is "financial in nature" or "incidental to
a financial activity" on its own accord. To date, the Board has only
exercised this authority to define one type of activity as permissible: acting
as a finder. " 8 The Board defined "acting as a finder" as "bringing together
one or more buyers and sellers of any product or service for transactions
that the parties themselves negotiate and consummate."' 9 In keeping with
the focus of the GLB Act on technology and its place in the financial
services industry, the Board included the following activities in its
definition of finder services: "[h]osting an electronic marketplace on the
financial holding company's Internet web site by providing hypertext or
similar links to the web sites of third party buyers or sellers;"'20 hosting on
the financial holding company's servers the web site of a buyer or seller
that provides information about that buyer or seller, its products and
services, and the ability to place bids, offers or orders (or confirmation
thereof);' 2 ' hosting the web site of a government or government agency that
describes the services or benefits provided by that entity, assists people in
completing applications for such services or benefits, and transmits the
application to the government or government agency; 2 and operating a
web site that gives multiple buyers and sellers the ability to exchange
information about products or services they wish to buy or sell, locate
interested parties, aggregate orders, and enter into transactions between
1n6 12 C.F.R. § 225.88(e) (2002).
"7 See supra notes 29 & 30 and accompanying text.
"s 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(d)(1).
119 Id.
"2 Id. § 225.86(d)(1)(ii)(A).
... Id. § 225.86(d)(1)(ii)(B)(1).
"I Id. § 225.86(d)(1)(ii)(B)(2).
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themselves (i.e., the buyer and seller, not the financial holding company
that hosts the web site). 23 Under this last provision, a financial holding
company would be permitted to operate an auction-type web site--some-
thing that certainly was never contemplated when the Bank Holding
Company Act was enacted in 1956, but is nonetheless quite a leap from the'
days when an activity had to be "so closely related" to banking.
While it has not issued any further formal rules defining other activities
as permissible under the grant of authority in Section 1843(k)(5), the Board
issued proposals for public comment that would recognize real estate
brokerage and management services as "financial in nature" or "incidental
to a financial activity"' 24 and would expand the range of data processing
services that a financial holding company could provide as "complementary
to a financial activity."'25 The proposal regarding real estate brokerage and
management services garnered considerable public comment, and as a
result, the deadline for public comment was extended from March 2, 2001
to May 1, 2001.126 More recently, the Board and the Secretary of the
Treasury delayed issuing any final rule on the real estate brokerage
proposal until 2003 due to the strong lobby against the proposal by real
estate agents.
27
121 Id. § 225.86(d)(1)(ii)(C).
124 Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control [and] Financial
Subsidiaries, 66 Fed. Reg. 307 (Jan. 3, 2001).
'25 Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,384
(Dec. 21, 2000).
26 Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control Financial Subsidiar-
ies, 66 Fed. Reg. 12,440 (Feb.27, 2001). See Dean Anason, DC Speaks: Realtor
Group Fighting to Keep Banks Off Its Turf AM. BANKER, June 8, 2001, at 4:
The Fed and Treasury received nearly 75,000 comment letters, and an
estimated 90% to 95% of them were from real estate agents criticizing the
plan. Fed officials said the agency got 42,040 letters, more than double the
record prompted by the ill-fated "know your customer" anti-money-
laundering plan that was withdrawn two [now more than three] years ago.
Id.
127 See Michele Heller, Realty Hitch Shows GLB Powers Still UphillFight, AM.
BANKER, Apr. 24, 2002, at 1. The National Association of Realtors has dubbed
their campaign against the proposal "Stop the Big Grab" and has featured logos
depicting the banking industry as a giant sea creature wrapping its tentacles around
the American home in its campaign materials. Anason, supra note 126, at 4. For a
discussion of the case in favor of permitting real estate brokerage activities, see
Gregory Baer, Realty Brokerage Indecision Stifles Gramm-Leach-Bliley, AM.
BANKER, Apr. 26, 2002, at 7.
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2. Activities That Are "Complementary to a Financial Activity"
The proposal relating to data processing is the only instance in which
the Board addressed what it would consider to be a "complementary"
activity. This type of permissible activity is the exclusive province of the
Board and financial holding companies, since the provisions relating to
national banks do not include "complementary" activities as permissible for
national banks or their subsidiaries. 2 In allowing the Board to define what
constitutes a "complementary" activity, the GLB Act constrains the
authority of the Board by limiting permissible activities to those that the
Board determines do "not pose a substantial risk to the safety or soundness
of depository institutions or the financial system generally."' 29 The Board
stated that in order to be considered "complementary," an activity must "in
some way complement or enhance a financial activity or there must be a
relationship or connection between the complementary activity and a
financial activity."'30 As to the intended use of this authority, the Board
acknowledged that:
The authority to engage in complementary activities was included as a
mechanism for allowing some amount of commercial or nonfinancial
activities so long as there is a connection between the complementary
activity and a financial activity conducted by the [financial holding
company] and the activity does not pose unacceptable risks to the safety
and soundness of the [financial holding company], its banks or the
banking system. At the same time, Congress rejected the invitation to
allow depository institutions to affiliate in an unrestricted manner with
commercial companies and determined not to permit [financial holding
companies] to engage in a basket of purely commercial activities that have
no connection to financial activities.1
3 1
Thus, "complementary" activities stand at the outermost fringes of
permissible activities, where the lines between banking and commerce
blur.
The Board proposal for expanded data processing activities is evidence
of how far the Board is willing to go. Under the "so closely related"
121 12 U.S.C. § 24a (2002).
"129 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B) (2002).
130 Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. at,
80,385.
131 id.
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standard, bank holding companies had been permitted to "engage in
processing financial, economic and banking data (and providing limited
amounts of general purpose data processing hardware).' 3' These activities
were not restricted as to the type of data processed, as long as revenues
from processing nonfinancial data did not exceed thirty percent of the total
data processing revenues of the company.133 The proposal not only seeks
to increase the allowable level of nonfinancial data processing from thirty
percent to forty-nine percent, 34 but also to allow financial holding
companies to engage in data storage (of both financial and nonfinancial
data), general data processing, (including data transmission hardware,
software, advice, and facilities) and provision of electronic information
portal services. 35 This last activity is defined by the Board to include
"providing on-line search engines..., bulletin boards, newsgroup services
.., 'chat' rooms, Internet web sites or portals that contain links to other
web sites, and aggregation services.... This activity would also include
acting as an Internet Service Provider."1 36 While the Board states that in
granting this authority it expects that financial holding companies will offer
these services in order to market and provide financial products and
services, it acknowledges that this type of activity will require investment
in companies "engaged in some degree of commercial activities.' 37 In
order to keep financial holding companies from exploiting this opportunity
to the detriment of the safety and soundness of the financial holding
company, the Board proposes that the carrying value of investments in
data storage, general data processing, and electronic information portal
services should be limited to five percent of the holding company's Tier 1
capital.
31
'32 Id. See also Ass'n of Data Proc. Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, 745
F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding the Board's permission for banks to pro-
vide data processing services and to supply hardware in data processing packages
to customers, provided that profits from manufacturing data processing hard-
ware do not exceed thirty percent of the package, as a proper exercise of the
Board's authority under the "incidental" standard of the Bank Holding Company
Act).
13' Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. at
80,385.
134 Id.
131 Id. at 80,386.
136 Id.
137 id.
138 Id.
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V. How WILL THE NEW STANDARD
SHAPE THE FUTURE OF THE BANKING INDUSTRY?
The Board has always had considerable discretion in determining what
activities would be permitted for bank holding companies. The standards
by which these activities have been deemed permissible are less bright-line
tests and more "jumping-offpoints" for Board analysis. While the GLB Act
has served to streamline and simplify the process by which activities are
permitted, it also has served to grant the Board even broader authority than
it held in the past. In many ways the playing field has been leveled, giving
smaller holding companies the ability to engage in activities that were
previously allowed to only the largest financial service pro-
viders--evidenced by the fact that the vast majority of the approximately
six hundred companies who have filed for financial holding company status
are smaller regional companies.' 39 At the same time, the field has been
widened considerably. It is true that the Internet and electronic commerce
are integral parts of the American economy, and the GLB Act was intended
to allow financial holding companies the ability to make the most of those
channels.
If the Board's interpretations of its authority under the GLB Act serve
as any prediction, it appears that there will not be many activities in which
a financial holding company will not be able to engage as long as the
activities are framed as at least tangential to a financial activity. Concur-
rently, however, the Board has shown that it is committed to maintaining
separation between banking and commerce--as is demonstrated by its
tough yet flexible stance on merchant banking investments. Further, the
Board is now more focused on Tier 1 capital levels as a safety and
soundness measure, shifting away from percent-of-revenue thresholds for
permissible activities. Taken together, these indications seem to signal that
the Board will use its new powers to allow financial institutions to get
further away from core banking activities as long as those operations are
balanced by sufficient capital to ensure that the risks that expanded
activities bring to the institution as a whole are borne by the institution
itself, rather than by the federal deposit insurance funds and taxpayers.
Reflecting on the effect that the GLB Act has had on the financial
services industry in the first two years after its enactment, one of the
authors of the Act, Representative Jim Leach, surmised that:
139 As of June 28, 2002, 609 companies had made effective financial holding
company elections. List at http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/Fhc
(updated periodically).
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[t]he goal of Gramm-Leach-Bliley was to create the most competitive and
the most stable environment for a financial market to function. In that
sense, it represented a change, but not a revolution; a change that was
consistent with the direction of markets. If the change had been inconsis-
tent, it would have thrown sand in the gears of finance and commerce.
Instead, (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) is intended to be a grease rather than
friction.
40
The new standard, as it has been interpreted, has enabled bank holding
companies to expand the scope of their services to meet the financial needs
of the twenty-first century consumer. Enhanced competition-getting
top-of-the line products into the hands of consumers at lower costs--is the
purpose of this Act. The interpretations that the Board has adopted to date
appear to have kept this purpose in mind. That being the case, the Board
will most likely continue to use the new standard for permissible
non-banking activities to allow bank holding companies and their affiliates
to engage in less conventional banking services as long as the Board
believes that the overall safety and soundness of the financial holding
company is not threatened. In making this determination, the Board's
assumed role as "umbrella regulator" will be critical. To what extent will
the Board rely on functional regulators to make assessments of affiliates
that engage in securities or insurance activities in formulating the overall
risk profile of a financial holding company who wishes to engage in
unconventional activities? This presents a possible stumbling block to
further expansion of permissible activities under the GLB Act, but as
technology continues to enable financial holding companies to offer new
and innovative products, it is likely that regulatory turf wars will take a
back seat to the insatiable demands of the American consumer.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whether or not the end result of the GLB Act will be to improve
competition and the provision of cutting-edge services in the financial
service industry remains to be seen. By enacting the GLB Act and its
change in the standard for permissible activities, Congress has placed the
future of the American financial services industry into the Board's hands.
While its authority is broad, the expansion in permissible activities made
to date appears to have kept in mind the safety and soundness concerns
'40 Michelle Heller, DC Speaks: For Leach, Consumers' Silence Speaks
Volumes, AM. BANKER, Nov. 16, 2001, at 1.
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absent in the era that led to the collapse of the American financial services
industry during the Great Depression. With the enactment and implementa-
tion of the GLB Act, financial services legislation has come full-circle in
the United States. It seems certain that the Board will use its discretion to
allow financial institutions to push the envelope in providing new products
and services to consumers as long as these institutions appear capable of
bearing the additional risks these activities pose. As long as the Board
continues to exercise its authority, mindful of the failures that made Glass-
Steagall necessary in the first place, the legacy of the GLB Act should be
one of unparalleled prosperity for the American economy well intothe
twenty-first century.
